Where does the 310 million tonne figure for the Russia-Ukraine war come from?

It comes from the Initiative on GHG Accounting of War (IGGAW), a project combining Ukraine's environmental organization Ecoaction with international researchers. The methodology was made public at COP29 in 2024 and has been updated periodically since. The latest version covers the period from the full-scale invasion in February 2022 through February 2026, arriving at a cumulative and projected additional emission of approximately 311.4 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. Military operations account for 37% of that total; post-war reconstruction and landscape fires each account for roughly 23% (the reconstruction figure is a projection — that spending hasn't happened yet); the remainder comes from aviation rerouting, damage to energy infrastructure, and refugee displacement.

How was the $57 billion figure calculated?

The report applies a social cost of carbon of $185 per tonne — a widely cited estimate, though published figures range from $44 to $413 per tonne depending on the study — multiplied by 310 million tonnes, yielding a climate damage figure exceeding $57 billion. This covers only the climate dimension; it excludes loss of life, physical infrastructure, or broader economic damage. In November of last year, Ukraine announced at COP30 that it would incorporate this type of accounting into the Register of Damage for Ukraine, an international reparations mechanism led by the Council of Europe, as one line item in its claims against Russia. At the time, the announcement cited an earlier version of the report — $43.8 billion and 240 million tonnes — which is somewhat lower than the figures in the latest update quoted here.

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Reflections & Memory

Violence Is an Emission Too

A carbon accounting of four years of full-scale war in Ukraine — putting violence itself on the climate ledger

Paul Kuo 郭曜郎 September 2026 4 min read AI-translated from the Chinese original

The takeaway

The conventional habit is to divide carbon emissions into industrial and lifestyle categories. The war accounting report effectively identifies a third: violence itself. And where you draw the boundary for that ledger — like any corporate carbon inventory — is a defensible judgment call, not a uniquely correct answer.

Four years of full-scale war has produced a cumulative and projected approximately 310 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent — roughly equivalent to France's entire annual emissions.
The single largest source is fuel burned by military operations, at 37%. Projected post-war reconstruction and combat-triggered landscape fires follow closely, each at roughly 23% — though the reconstruction figure hasn't yet materialized.
Applying a social cost of carbon of $185 per tonne yields climate damages exceeding $57 billion. The reconstruction bill will be recalculated once rebuilding actually begins.

311.4 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. That is the cumulative and projected greenhouse gas total for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, from February 2022 through February 2026 — four years of war. It is roughly equal to France’s entire annual emissions, or half of Germany’s.

This number didn’t come from any government’s press office. It was produced by the Initiative on GHG Accounting of War, a team combining Ukraine’s environmental organization Ecoaction with international researchers. The methodology was first presented publicly at COP29 in 2024 and has been updated at intervals since. I reviewed their latest report — the forty-eighth month update, released after the four-year mark, covering through February 2026 — and the numbers check out.

Those 310 million tonnes break down across six categories. Military operations — diesel and jet fuel burned by tanks, aircraft, and armored vehicles — account for 37%, or 114.1 million tonnes, the single largest source. Post-war reconstruction comes second at a projected 73.3 million tonnes (23%), though none of that spending has actually occurred yet; these are estimated future costs. Landscape fires triggered by combat follow closely at 70.3 million tonnes, also roughly 23%. Ukraine’s wildfires burned through 1.39 million hectares in 2025, far above pre-war levels; drought made the fires harder to suppress. The research team estimated this figure by comparing data from conflict zones versus non-conflict zones and factoring in degraded firefighting capacity during wartime — not by tracing the origin of every individual fire. The remaining 17% is divided among aviation rerouting, damage to energy infrastructure, and refugee displacement.

Four years of war: where the carbon went — Military Operations 114.1 Mt, Post-war Reconstruction 73.3 Mt, Landscape Fires 70.3 Mt, Aviation Rerouting 29.8 Mt, Energy Infrastructure 18.6 Mt, Refugee Displacement 5.3 Mt

At a social cost of carbon of $185 per tonne, the climate damage exceeds $57 billion. That covers only the climate dimension — no lives, no homes, no economic losses. This $57 billion figure comes from the latest report (through February 2026). When Ukraine announced at COP30 last November that it would incorporate this kind of accounting into the Register of Damage for Ukraine — an international reparations mechanism led by the Council of Europe — as one line item in its claims against Russia, it was citing an earlier version of the report: $43.8 billion and 240 million tonnes, both lower than the current figures. To my knowledge, formally submitting war-related carbon emissions as the basis for reparations claims against an aggressor state is genuinely uncommon. COP29 in November 2024 put the methodology on the table; COP30 in November 2025, roughly a year later, turned it into a reparations instrument.

When I work through carbon issues with business owners, we rarely start by calculating emissions. We start by deciding where to draw the boundary. Does the coal the factory burns on-site count? What about the raw materials a supplier ships in? Employee commutes? Every layer you push outward adds another layer of dispute. The war accounting team faced exactly the same problem, only harder: fuel for tanks is straightforward enough, but do you include wildfires ignited by combat? The concrete for future reconstruction? Each of those choices is itself a position. This report drew the boundary broadly, including landscape fires and projected reconstruction. The reasoning is laid out in the report, available for scrutiny.

Climate conversations typically sort emissions into two buckets: industrial and lifestyle. This report is a reminder that there is a third: violence itself. A tank’s diesel, a burning field, a factory bombed and then rebuilt — all of it is going into the atmosphere. And those emissions don’t stop when a ceasefire is signed. The steel and concrete for reconstruction are the next wave of the ledger.

When countries negotiate emissions reduction targets at climate summits, “fighting one fewer war” almost never appears in anyone’s cost-benefit analysis. The 73.3 million tonnes for reconstruction is still a projection. When the concrete trucks actually roll into Kyiv, the numbers will be revised. A war’s carbon debt doesn’t settle on the day the guns go quiet.

Peace is the most effective climate policy.

References

Initiative on GHG Accounting of War, Climate Damage Caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine (48-month update, 2026.02)
Planetary Security Initiative, Climate damage caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine
Earth.org, 3 Years On, War Is Largest Source of Carbon Emissions in Ukraine

Appendix

Frequently Asked Questions

Where does the 310 million tonne figure for the Russia-Ukraine war come from?: It comes from the Initiative on GHG Accounting of War (IGGAW), a project combining Ukraine's environmental organization Ecoaction with international researchers. The methodology was made public at COP29 in 2024 and has been updated periodically since. The latest version covers the period from the full-scale invasion in February 2022 through February 2026, arriving at a cumulative and projected additional emission of approximately 311.4 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. Military operations account for 37% of that total; post-war reconstruction and landscape fires each account for roughly 23% (the reconstruction figure is a projection — that spending hasn't happened yet); the remainder comes from aviation rerouting, damage to energy infrastructure, and refugee displacement.
How was the $57 billion figure calculated?: The report applies a social cost of carbon of $185 per tonne — a widely cited estimate, though published figures range from $44 to $413 per tonne depending on the study — multiplied by 310 million tonnes, yielding a climate damage figure exceeding $57 billion. This covers only the climate dimension; it excludes loss of life, physical infrastructure, or broader economic damage. In November of last year, Ukraine announced at COP30 that it would incorporate this type of accounting into the Register of Damage for Ukraine, an international reparations mechanism led by the Council of Europe, as one line item in its claims against Russia. At the time, the announcement cited an earlier version of the report — $43.8 billion and 240 million tonnes — which is somewhat lower than the figures in the latest update quoted here.

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